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Table 1 Multinomial logistic regression of the three types of successful job seekers by employment environment, individual recourses, and their interactions, CGSS Urban Section, 2003

From: Institutions and individual strategies: how did job seekers respond to the changing employment environment in urban China?

  Adventurers vs. adherents Networkers vs. adherents Networkers vs. adventurers
Education Model Party Membership Model Family Background Model Education Model Party Membership Model Family Background Model Education Model Party Membership Model Family Background Model
External employment environment
Temporal dimension (ref: Before 1979)
  1979–1991 1.668 (0.345)*** 1.055 (0.107)*** 1.094 (0.156)*** 0.165 (0.723) 0.642 (0.206)** 0.839 (0.337)* −1.502 (0.727)** −0.414 (0.213)* −0.255 (0.347)
  1992–1997 3.190 (0.506)*** 1.787 (0.141)*** 2.114 (0.226)*** 1.316 (0.813) 1.189 (0.255)*** 0.893 (0.423)* −1.874 (0.804)* −0.598 (0.254)* −1.221 (0.428)**
  1998–2003 3.666 (0.466)*** 3.182 (0.154)*** 3.193 (0.235)*** 1.807 (1.342) 1.490 (0.306)*** 1.372 (0.457)*** −1.858 (1.311) −1.692 (0.300)*** −1.821 (0.456)***
Spatial dimension (ref: metropolitan region)
  Coastal region 1.250 (0.408)*** 0.075 (0.108) 0.348 (0.187) −1.809 (0.924)+ −0.680 (0.225)** −1.331 (0.392)+ −3.059 (0.963)** −0.756 (0.225) −1.679 (0.401)**
  Interior region 1.197 (0.388)*** 0.175 (0.100) 0.450 (0.173) −0.422 (0.559) −0.137 (0.182) −0.779 (0.274) −1.619 (0.593)*** −0.311 (0.182) −1.229 (0.283)*
Individual resources
 Education −0.001 (0.036) −0.156 (0.015)*** −0.157 (0.015)*** −0.137 (0.055)* −0.059 (0.031)* −0.060 (0.032)* −0.137 (0.060)** 0.097 (0.031)** 0.097 (0.032)**
 Party membership −1.173 (0.151)*** −0.081 (0.427) −1.198 (0.148)*** 0.343 (0.224) −0.171 (0.735) 0.328 (0.227) 1.516 (0.236)*** −0.090 (0.797) 1.526 (0.239)***
 Father’s highest education −0.003 (0.009) −0.003 (0.009) 0.055 (0.022)** 0.059 (0.017)** 0.057 (0.017)** −0.028 (0.037) 0.062 (0.017)** 0.060 (0.017)** −0.083 (0.040)***
 Father’s party membership −0.125 (0.091) −0.131 (0.091) −0.112 (0.091) 0.127 (0.169) 0.113 (0.170) 0.113 (0.170) 0.252 (0.167) 0.245 (0.168) 0.225 (0.168)
Interplay
 1979–1991 −0.071 (0.034)* −0.204 (0.410) −0.010 (0.022) 0.071 (0.069) 1.131 (0.672)* 0.002 (0.043) 0.142 (0.070)*** 1.335 (0.755)+ 0.012 (0.04)
 1992–1997 −0.141 (0.046)** 0.001 (0.447) −0.049 (0.028) 0.002 (0.072) 0.425 (0.737) 0.041 (0.049) 0.143 (0.073)+ 0.424 (0.804) 0.090 (0.051)*
 1998–2003 −0.067 (0.041) −0.692 (0.411) −0.024 (0.028) −0.044 (0.118) −0.829 (0.783) −0.022 (0.051) 0.023 (0.116) −0.138 (0.829) 0.002 (0.051)
 Coastal region −0.117 (0.038)*** −1.116 (0.397)*** −0.046 (0.023)** 0.113 (0.081) 0.422 (0.534) 0.100 (0.044)*** 0.230 (0.085)** 1.538 (0.580)*** 0.146 (0.045)***
 Interior region −0.101 (0.036) *** −0.789 (0.347)** −0.045 (0.022)*** 0.021 (0.051) −0.168 (0.447) 0.080 (0.033)*** 0.122 (0.054)** 0.621 (0.487) 0.125 (0.034)***
Control variables
 Female 0.095 (0.077) 0.097 (0.078) 0.095 (0.078) −0.028 (0.150) −0.030 (0.150) −0.046 (0.150) −0.122 (0.149) −0.127 (0.149) −0.141 (0.149)
 Age −0.005 (0.025) −0.014 (0.024) −0.010 (0.024) 0.014 (0.044) −0.004 (0.047) 0.016 (0.043) 0.019 (0.044) 0.010 (0.047) 0.026 (0.043)
 Age square −0.001 (0.000) −0.000 (0.000) −0.000 (0.000) −0.000 (0.001) −0.000 (0.001) −0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
Constant −0.505 (0.497) 1.063 (0.374)* 0.703 (0.390) −1.672 (0.885)* −2.088 (0.772)* −1.816 (0.737)* −1.168 (0.916)* −3.151 (0.777)*** −2.519 (0.748)
Log likelihood −3628 −3629 −3636       
Observations 4857 4857 4857       
  1. Note: 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimations were clustered at the provincial level with the population weight variable used as probability weights. 2. The father’s highest education was used in the interaction term in the Family Background Model. 3. For the convenience of interpretation, all possible comparing pairs were reported
  2. ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05 + p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests)