The social bases of a committed labor force: how guanxi works in the Chinese factories?

Zhu, Yan

doi:10.1186/s40711-018-0072-y

The Journal of Chinese Sociology

Table 4 Native-place ties and organizational commitment: a direct effect

From: The social bases of a committed labor force: how guanxi works in the Chinese factories?

	Model 1 Controls	Model 2 With owner	Model 3 With mid-level manager	Model 4 With lower-level supervisor	Model 5 Full model
Fixed effect	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.
Native-place tie
With owner (no such tie as ref.)
Not-so-close		− .503^**			− .520^***
Close		.529			.129
With mid-level manager (no such tie as ref.)
Not-so-close			− .211		.001
Close			.440^*		.401^**
With lower-level supervisor (no such tie as ref.)
Not-so-close				−.168	− .061
Close				.104	.018
Controls (individual level)
Gender (male = 1)	− .333^***	− .357^***	− .332^***	− .321^***	− .340^***
Years of schooling	.052^**	.057^**	.052^**	.051^**	.054^**
Hukou (local urban as ref.)
Local rural	− .175	− .136	− .129	− .163	−.145
Nonlocal urban	− .409^**	− .435^**	− .410^**	− .428^**	− .457^**
Nonlocal rural	− .331^**	− .373^**	− .329^**	− .349^**	− .384^**
Cohort (before 1980 as ref.)
1980–1986	− .205	− .212	− .215	− .231^*	− .207
After 1986	− .296^**	− .309^**	− .295^**	− .313^**	− .295^**
Work experience	− .017^*	− .019^**	− .019^**	− .019^**	− .169^*
Occupational class (manager/technical as ref.)
Routine nonmanual	− .214	− .182	− .163	− .185	− .210
Skilled worker/shop floor	− .382^*	− .354^*	− .332^*	− .366^*	− .367^*
Unskilled worker	− .473^**	− .419^**	− .395^**	− .435^**	− .439^**
Hourly wage (log)	.638^***	.617^***	.600^***	.612^***	.593^***
Labor contract (yes = 1)	.177	.191	.187	.209^*	.188
Social insurance (yes = 1)	− .036	− .008	− .010	− .028	− .029
Workplace abuse (yes = 1)	− .234^*	− .247^*	− .232^*	− .223^*	− .240^*
Union membership (yes = 1)	.276^*	.313^**	.280^*	.289^*	.293^*
Work autonomy	− .059^*	− .048	− .052^*	− .059^*	− .047
Democratic participation	.301^***	.280^**	.278^**	.294^**	.266^**
Controls (group)
City	+	+	+	+	+
Industry	−	−	−	−	−
Ownership (state-owned as ref.)
Private	− .652	− .650	− .738	− .654	− .638
Foreign	− 1.237^**	− 1.159^*	− 1.238^**	− 1.198^**	− 1.221^**
Joint	− .927^*	− .899^*	− .987^**	− 1.006^**	− .906^*
Scale of organization (log)	− .009	− .001	.023	− .017	.013
Labor intensive	.165	.154	.146	.188	.202
Human capital stock	− .006	− .006	− .006	− .004	− .006
Rights protection institutions	.006	.011	.059	.195	.001
Intercept	3.141^***	3.177^***	3.011^***	3.120^***	3.188^***
Random effect	Sd.	Sd.	Sd.	Sd.	Sd.
Level 2 effect	1.758	1.763	1.828	1.812	1.746
Level 1 effect	2.962	2.929	2.915	2.929	2.957
Deviance	25,823.8	25,791.3	25,782.1	25,803.4	25,804.9
Level 2 observation	282	282	282	282	282
Level 1 observation	5046	5046	5046	5046	5046

^*p < 0.1, ^**p < 0.05, ^***p < 0.01

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