From: Organizational imprinting and the welfare practice of Chinese state-owned enterprises
Independent variables | Model 5 | Model 6 | Model 7 | Model 8 |
---|---|---|---|---|
Per-capita welfare investment | Dining hall | Clinic | Childcare facility | |
Restructured | .224 (.584) | .365 (.422) | .115 (.358) | − .298 (.489) |
Log of profit (in 10,000 RMB) | − .011 (.329) | − .093 (.211) | − .121 (.265) | .042 (.187) |
Average wage | .002*** (.000) | .000 (.000) | − .000 (.000) | − .000 (.000) |
Log of number of employees | .253 (.215) | .002 (.158) | .816*** (.160) | .929*** (.218) |
Customers’ demand for labor protection | .621 (.640) | 1.124** (.496) | − .731* (.401) | − .916 (.577) |
Annual frequency of government inspection | − .096 (.141) | .173 (.155) | − .019 (.085) | − .063 (.129) |
CEO’s political participation | − .174 (.589) | − .002 (.408) | .239 (.356) | .026 (.523) |
CEO’s education | − .408 (.259) | − .029 (.181) | .217 (.153) | − .024 (.225) |
Constant | − .785 (.379) | 1.564 (2.525) | − .3981 (3.063) | − 7.859*** (2.426) |
LR test | 0.01 | 11.03*** | 0.07 | 2.65** |