From: Organizational imprinting and the welfare practice of Chinese state-owned enterprises
Independent variables | Model 9 | Model 10 | Model 11 | Model 12 |
---|---|---|---|---|
Per-capita welfare investment | Dining hall | Clinic | Childcare facility | |
Imprint duration (year) | − .061 (.037) | − .010 (.023) | .028 (.018) | .094 (.050) |
Log of profit (in 10,000 RMB) | − 2.310 (2.358) | 4.445 (3.045) | .789 (1.568) | − .1568 (1.684) |
Average wage | .003*** (.001) | .000 (.001) | − .001 (.001) | − .001 (.001) |
Log of number of employees | 1.158*** (.518) | − .439 (.372) | .913*** (.303) | 1.114* (.597) |
Customers’ demand for labor protection | .341 (1.195) | .975 (.798) | .233 (.596) | .416 (1.276) |
Annual frequency of inspection | − .189 (.246) | .155 (.244) | − .254 (.297) | − 1.015 (.730) |
CEO’s political participation | .671 (1.067) | .563 (.681) | − .671 (.553) | − .132 (1.272) |
CEO’s education | − 1.1013** (.504) | .375 (.333) | .042 (.240) | .332 (.592) |
Constant | 21.595 (25.365) | − 48.088 (3.3799) | − 14.089 (17.120) | 7.209 (17.722) |
LR test | 3.00** | 4.80** | 0.01 | 0.03 |