From: Organizational imprinting and the welfare practice of Chinese state-owned enterprises
Independent variable | Model 13 | Model 14 | Model 15 | Model 16 |
---|---|---|---|---|
Per-capita welfare investment | Dining hall | Clinic | Childcare facility | |
Restructure duration (year) | − .259** (.126) | .144 (.104) | − .109* (.066) | − .153 (.111) |
Log of profit (in 10,000 RMB) | − 2.608 (2.216) | 4.201 (2.911) | .254 (1.497) | − 1.350 (1.419) |
Average wage | .004*** (.001) | .000 (.001) | − .001 (.000) | − .001 (.000) |
Log of number of employees | .659 (.433) | −.570* (.326) | 1.122*** (.281) | 1.691*** (.539) |
Customers’ demand for labor protection | 1.113 (.991) | 1.175 (.717) | − .098 (.533) | − .421 (.888) |
Annual frequency of government inspection | − .069 (.234) | .242 (.298) | − .177 (.251) | − 1.142* (.642) |
CEO’s political participation | − .013 (.946) | .478 (.633) | − .301 (.510) | − .235 (1.008) |
CEO’s education | − .923** (.429) | .370 (.304) | .097 (.219) | .685 (.488) |
Constant | 24.661 (2.3818) | − 45.618 (32.251) | − 9.572 (16.447) | 4.344 (14.598) |
LR test | 3.00** | 6.54*** | 0.01 | 0.01 |