Cadre parents and their entrepreneur children? The dual-track intergenerational reproduction of elites in China: 1978–2010

The Journal of Chinese Sociology

Table 3 CMLR analysis of the determinants of status attainment

	Model 1		Model 2: 1978–1992		Model 3: 1993–2002		Model 4: 2003–2010
	Origin	Destination	Origin	Destination	Origin	Destination	Origin	Destination
Scale matrix
Non-elite	−0.789	−0.547	0.006	−0.313	−0.803	−0.489	0.276	−0.527
Technocratic elite	−0.062	0.343	−0.066	0.464	−0.037	0.373	−0.142	0.143
Market elite	0.503	−0.428	−0.675	−0.657	0.437	−0.496	−0.446	−0.368
State elite	0.348	0.632	0.735	0.506	0.403	0.613	0.313	0.752
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
Immobility and inheritance effects
Non-elite	0.393^†	(0.214)	0.123	(0.343)	0.748*	(0.316)	0.081	(0.225)
Technocratic elite	0.138	(0.200)	0.599	(0.457)	−0.214	(0.369)	0.275	(0.318)
Market elite	0.563^†	(0.306)	1.073	(1.150)	0.194	(0.634)	0.906**	(0.346)
State elite	0.358	(0.334)	−0.205	(0.708)	0.249	(0.609)	0.387	(0.477)
Uniform association	−0.524*	(0.258)	−0.727	(0.767)	−0.708^†	(0.423)	1.187	(0.748)
Main effect (SOR)
Education	1.912***	(0.104)	2.090***	(0.217)	2.340***	(0.250)	2.386***	(0.199)
Job sector	1.050***	(0.156)	2.706***	(0.527)	1.797***	(0.425)	0.950***	(0.244)
CPC membership	0.700***	(0.143)	0.457	(0.320)	0.706*	(0.303)	1.207***	(0.249)
Main effect	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Number of observations	4304		1593		881		1830
BIC	4915.359		1302.967		1318.401		2507.523

Notes. Main effect includes gender, age, none-agriculture residence, siblings’ number, and region. The scaling metrics are normalized. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ^†p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests)