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Table 3 CMLR analysis of the determinants of status attainment

From: Cadre parents and their entrepreneur children? The dual-track intergenerational reproduction of elites in China: 1978–2010

  Model 1 Model 2: 1978–1992 Model 3: 1993–2002 Model 4: 2003–2010
  Origin Destination Origin Destination Origin Destination Origin Destination
Scale matrix         
 Non-elite −0.789 −0.547 0.006 −0.313 −0.803 −0.489 0.276 −0.527
 Technocratic elite −0.062 0.343 −0.066 0.464 −0.037 0.373 −0.142 0.143
 Market elite 0.503 −0.428 −0.675 −0.657 0.437 −0.496 −0.446 −0.368
 State elite 0.348 0.632 0.735 0.506 0.403 0.613 0.313 0.752
  Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Immobility and inheritance effects         
 Non-elite 0.393 (0.214) 0.123 (0.343) 0.748* (0.316) 0.081 (0.225)
 Technocratic elite 0.138 (0.200) 0.599 (0.457) −0.214 (0.369) 0.275 (0.318)
 Market elite 0.563 (0.306) 1.073 (1.150) 0.194 (0.634) 0.906** (0.346)
 State elite 0.358 (0.334) −0.205 (0.708) 0.249 (0.609) 0.387 (0.477)
Uniform association −0.524* (0.258) −0.727 (0.767) −0.708 (0.423) 1.187 (0.748)
Main effect (SOR)         
 Education 1.912*** (0.104) 2.090*** (0.217) 2.340*** (0.250) 2.386*** (0.199)
 Job sector 1.050*** (0.156) 2.706*** (0.527) 1.797*** (0.425) 0.950*** (0.244)
 CPC membership 0.700*** (0.143) 0.457 (0.320) 0.706* (0.303) 1.207*** (0.249)
Main effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Number of observations 4304   1593   881   1830  
BIC 4915.359   1302.967   1318.401   2507.523  
  1. Notes. Main effect includes gender, age, none-agriculture residence, siblings’ number, and region. The scaling metrics are normalized. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests)