Theoretical background
Based on convergence theory, the Goode model of family changes argues that as societies modernize and industrialize, family life too will transform from a more “traditional” setup to a more “modern” conception (Goode 1963). Some studies have applied this theory to explain how modernization has impacted Chinese familial life (Xu and Whyte 1990; Xu 1994). In ascertaining the causes of changes in family traits and norms from past to present, numerous mechanisms have been proposed, such as social structural changes, direct government intervention, and cultural influence from western values (Whyte 1990).
Regarding the specific influences on an individual’s mate selection process, Kalmijn’s (1998) theory identifies three core determinants: first, the marriage candidate’s own preferences play a role in determining the desirability of a potential spouse. These preferences are partly defined by resource requirements, such as socioeconomic resources and cultural resources, but these resource-based needs are supplemented with preferences for homogamy, i.e., marrying into a partnership with shared income, status, taste, values, and lifestyles (Kalmijn 1991). Second, third-party involvement from parents or extended family members is incentivized by preserving in-group homogamy. The extent to which younger generations are embedded in the same set of cultural and societal values determines the conflict between these first and second determinants and the relative strength of an individual’s preferences versus the preferences of those not directly involved in the marriage. Finally, an individual is limited by opportunity constraints in selecting whom to marry. Kalmijn (1998) argues that structural constraints define the pool of possible candidates based on daily interactions, facilitated by group membership to schools, workplaces, and religious organizations and limited by geographic proximity to a local marriage market.
While Kalmijn’s theory focuses on selecting a marriage partner and explaining homogamy, we apply a similar framework to our study. Specifically, one can ask how Kalmijn’s three determinants increase and wane in relative strength as a society modernizes. Technological advancement and the advent of the internet has resulted in ‘the death of distance,’ lessening the restrictiveness of Kalmijn’s third hypothesis over opportunity constraints, though not entirely abating its influence. The interplay between Kalmijn’s first and second hypotheses is of greater relevance for our work. We wish to ascertain the continuity and conflict between an individual’s preferences and those of a third-party influencer (i.e., parents).
Matchmaking methods have varying degrees of third party influence, where more traditional forms may represent a greater ascription to historical gendered and generational norms, while emerging forms, such as online dating, place greater emphasis on individualism and have wider pools of choice, but do not guarantee that traditional norms are ignored. Irrespective of the mode of matchmaking, different generations and genders may display specific preferences for certain attributes of a suitable partner, and the values assigned to these partner attributes (e.g., income, education, or filial piety) are subject to changing social dynamics of the time (Blair and Madigan 20162018; Lui 2019; Chang et al. 2011; Ong and Wang 2015). Studying such preferences in mate selection thus reflects how the values of today's world operate and are passed onto future generations (Schwartz 2013) and offer an insight into tomorrow’s social values and norms.
The following section documents the relevant literature and background on the modernization of Chinese society over the past three decades and how it has introduced tensions between traditional and emerging value systems around gender and generational norms in mate selection.
Gender influences on mate selection
In traditional Chinese society and philosophy, men and women were assumed to exist in a natural hierarchy of the superior and the inferior (Rosenlee 2006). The separation of the sexes was rooted in the believed natural order of the cosmos, where men, equated with yang, are dominant, dynamic, powerful, and superior, and women, paired with yin, are subservient, still, gentle and inferior (Hall and Ames 1998; Wang 2012). These supposed innate differences relegated women to the ‘inner’ sphere concerning domestic duties and support for the husband and men to the ‘outer’ sphere focusing on legal, economic, and political mattersFootnote 3 (Hall and Ames 1998). The assumed natural hierarchy of women as the weaker sex moralized a system of oppressive practices, including approval of concubinage, foot binding, and widow chastity (Ebrey 2020; Wang 2003). By the end of the Han dynasty, the Confucian treatment of women as the lowest rank in relational hierarchies was broadly established, and the distinct separation of women from mainstream political and intellectual discourse presided into the Song and Qing dynastic periods (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed August 10, 2020).
Since the establishment of power by the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1949, the role of women has undergone several key transformations. Firstly, women have enjoyed greater occupational and educational emancipation. Between 1949 and 1952, female labor force participation rose to 74% as compared to 87% for men (Nan and Xue 2002). Nowadays, China’s female labor force participation is ranked 47 out of 180 in 2019 (Indexmundi 2019). During the same period, women's educational attainment rose dramatically, and women’s college enrolment surpassed men’s in the first decade of the twenty-first century (Wu and Zhang 2010; Yeung 2013). Simultaneous changes in the structure of China’s economy and society, such as urbanization, individualism, and industrialization, along with the rise of feminist thought, shifted gendered dynamics (Liu et al. 2013). Higher female education and employment allowed for less traditional gender divisions of labor, granting women greater financial and occupational freedom (Hu and Scott 2016). Such freedoms changed the power dynamics in personal relationships, with Chinese women exercising greater say and participation in household decision-making (Guthrie 2008; Gittings 2006).
Secondly, since the CPC came to power, gender equality has witnessed a growing role in policy rhetoric, with Mao’s famed proclamation that “women hold up half the sky” becoming the slogan of the women's liberation movement (Croll 1995). Support for women’s rights gained traction in policy, with China being one of the first countries to disallow all forms of discrimination towards women at the United Nations International Convention in 1980 (Attané 2012). Another way in which policy has changed women’s role in Chinese society is through the one-child policy. By reducing family size and domestic burden, four decades of the one-child policy has been attributed to helping women remain in their professional careers and a resultant increase in dual-earner households (Ma et al. 2011). Similarly, the introduction of the one-child policy has been cited as reducing the traction of patrilineal norms (Deutsch 2006).
Despite these transformations of gender norms, aspects of modern Chinese society still confine women to traditional roles and stereotypes (Jankowiak and Li 2014). The survey of Evans (2008) has shown the appropriateness of male and female roles remains unchallenged, with over 60% of respondents retaining belief in the statement “men are turned towards society, women devote themselves for the family.” Policy introductions can be a double-edged sword, with studies showing that the one-child policy has negatively affected women as it promoted female infanticides (Croll 2012). Further, research has also shown that post-reform era economic pressures have increased age hypergamy, i.e., women preferred older men for greater financial and social potential, while men marry later to accumulate greater resources (Mu and Xie 2014). In other countries, the resulting gender imbalance of community sex ratio and increased spousal age gap within marriage has been shown to correlate to inter-partner violence and men wielding more control over their wives (Bose et al. 2013; Angelucci and Heath 2020). Further, even with four decades of women’s liberation through structural change and government agendas, the role and status of women remain separate and inferior in many regards (Attané 2012).
When considering how these shifts in gender norms subsequently affect family and marriage decisions, seemingly conflicting value systems continue to play. On the one hand, new gender dynamics are taking hold, with both males and females facing a relatively weaker desire to marry young, particularly for women who have access to greater financial and educational freedom in their professional careers (Lui 2019). On the other hand, stereotypical gender norms remain. Blair and Madigan (2016:16) report that “in keeping with long-standing gender stereotypes, females did express a greater preference for more pragmatic qualities in a male partner (well educated, wealthy, successful, and ambitious).” In this regard, the Chinese youth are trying to manage pressures from traditional cultural values and modern progressive expectations (Blair and Madigan 2018). Further work is required to document how these tensions govern mate selection processes.
Generational influences on mate selection
In China, parents play a significant role in their children's romantic life and marriage, which can be traced back to traditional cultural values. The Confucian concept of filial piety (xiaojing, 孝敬) enforces a two-part value system on the child: xiao (孝), a material or financial commitment of care, where children reimburse their parents in later life, and jing (敬), non-material respect and obedience to the elderly (Hu and Scott 2016). Thus, filial piety exerts a culturally-imposed contract between parent and child. Furthermore, China is considered a collectivist society where a person's commitment to social institutions, especially the family, is prioritized over individual preferences (Ting-Toomey et al. 1991). As outlined in the classic Confucian text The Great Learning, upholding proper marital and family values serves as building blocks to stabilize society, and elements of this thinking persist to modern-day policy (Kirk et al. 2020).
Traditionally, parental preferences played a dominant role in curating the family unit, where arranged marriages were the norm, and parents assigned spouses to their children on the grounds of social and economic suitability (Yang 1968). In a patrilineal society, a married woman served her elders and her husband with an obligation to produce a male heir (Baker 1979). Under this traditional treatment of marriage, where obligations to the parents and the family take precedence over individual needs, “the marital relationship was hardly the focus of romantic expectations” (Pimentel 2000: 33). Emotional feelings of the individuals involved in the marriage contract were quashed by the responsibility to align with the hierarchical axes of devotion to patrilineal familial values and maintenance of gendered values (Potter 1988).
Over the past three decades, significant socioeconomic and cultural changes in China as part of the modernization process have likely impacted intergenerational relationships. Since 1989, China has opened up dramatically to western influences, and increased international trade has brought about rapid economic changes. Wages have risen, and geographic mobility has increased across the nation, with migrants traveling greater distances (Gao and Wang 2020). This means not only greater physical distance from the family but also more cultural differences with children adopting lifestyles and value systems from those of their parents (Jackson and Liu 2017). For example, the experiences of parents who have lived through the Cultural Revolution are different from those of younger generations who have taken on more individualistic ideas (Jackson and Liu 2017).
This modernization process has also significantly altered both family and relationship dynamics in contemporary China, resulting in differences in the values held by older and younger cohorts. Research has indicated an increasing acceptance of sexual and intimate relationships in college-age daters (Yang 2011), the lower stigma surrounding divorce (Farmer 2020), the later average age of marriage (Lui 2019), and the greater desire for romantic not arranged marriage decisions (Lai and Thornton 2015). When comparing generational priorities for mate selection, Chang et al. (2011) document a decline in the importance of values such as virginity and an increase in significance given to religiosity and earning capacity. Given such changes, the Chinese youth call for less interference from their parents in their dating and marriage life (Xinhuanet.com 2019).
Despite these generational divides, filial piety remains an important determinant in governing Chinese family life (Zhang 2016). Financial emancipation, reduced patrilocalism (shared occupancy with paternal in-laws), and an improved social security net has reduced the material necessity for filial piety (Ma et al. 2011). However, the non-material aspect (jing) continues to be stressed as a moral and virtuous obligation of China’s youth (Liu 2008). The societal pressure to fulfill such duties is not abated by geographical distance from one’s parents (Jackson and Liu 2017) or greater educational attainment (Hu and Scott 2016). Parental involvement remains strongly influential in family and marital decisions (Riley 1994; Pimentel 2000), and while Chinese youths find their partner, they still wish to satisfy their parents' wishes (Zhang and Kline 2009). Such considerations can yield positive marriage outcomes for couples, and research shows that parental approval of mate choice is a determinant of later marriage quality and happiness (Pimentel 2000).
Marriage also continues to be a binding social norm for the majority of young people, even with contemporary acceptance of other forms of dating (Evans 2008; Lui 2019; Ji and Yeung 2014). In a 2010 survey, Attané (2012:9) reports that 48% of women and 40% of men believed in the statement “a good marriage is better than a good career,” indicating marriage is still seen as a conveyor of social status. Despite the continuing importance of marriage norms, both in urban and rural areas (Lui 2019), the process has shifted away from arranged marriage towards more free choice in mate selection (Xu and Whyte 1990).
These tensions between new and old values result in China’s youth being pushed and pulled from different directions when making mate selection decisions. On the one hand, the strong social values and need for financial support in old age mean that China’s youth continue to feel obligated to provide care for their parents (Zhang 2016), thus accommodating their preferences. While at the same time, they have been exposed to new modern ideas and are moving towards individualism, with greater acceptance for prioritizing their own needs (Yang 2011). Previous attempts have been made to compare generational differences in partner preferences (Chang et al. 2011), but they do so by comparing preferences between two different points in time. Others have attempted to study how parental involvement affects preferences (Huang et al. 2016) but do so only from the husband’s perspective. Thus, it is difficult to ascertain how intergenerational tensions play out in a contemporary setting of mate selection.
Interaction of gender and generational influences
How do gender and generational relations interact with each other? In the contemporary setting, while cultural values continue to guide gender and intergenerational values in Chinese society, they do so with heterogeneous effects across the population. Women are likely to be less traditional than men in their views towards patrilineal norms and gender roles (Hu and Scott 2016). Additionally, the dramatic pace of China’s modernization has created sizeable differences in the life experiences of younger and older cohorts, but the direction of effect from modernizing influences is not always consistent. For example, Hu and Scott (2016) show that higher education levels corrode belief in traditional gender norms but enhance commitment to filial piety. Similarly, while there have been generational shifts towards a greater acceptance of later marriage age, such a privilege is not accorded to both genders, with higher-educated females who are not married by the age of 27 years old being considered sheng nv (剩女) or “leftover women” (Feldshuh 2017).
The interaction of gender and generational influences affects partner choice and relationship preferences. In past decades, the Chinese youth have been introduced to romantic love and dating culture (Yang 2011; Blair and Madigan 2018). For both genders, the rise of individualism has allowed young people to treat mate selection as a choice to fulfill their own needs and obligations, not that of their family and society as expected in collectivist cultures (Dion and Dion 1988; Yang 1968). Exploratory premarital relationships, dating, and even intimacy among college-age students have become more widely accepted in the past two decades (Yang 2011), and both young men and women wish to date more frequently (Blair and Madigan 2016). However, even in newer and more casual forms of matchmaking, such as online dating platforms, gender differences persist. Studies have found that men tend to message younger females while females message older men (Xia et al. 2014). Further findings suggest women prefer men with higher income, while men message women of all income levels (Ong and Wang 2015; Xia et al. 2014).
Finding a partner who conforms to gender and generational expectations becomes a complicated negotiation process, as structural shifts in traditional norms and family values have introduced sharp discontinuities across both lines (Blair and Madigan 2016; Hu and Scott 2016). Understanding this negotiation process requires us to understand the preferences across both gender and generational influences and how they interact with each other. By documenting partner preferences by gender, generation, and their interaction, our research contributes to the literature on changing partner preferences and family life in China.